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STRUGGLING PARADIGMS IN A FRICTION-FREE WORLD: 
LIABILITY FOR CONTENT IN POST-PRINT CULTURE* 
NICOLAS P. TERRY** 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The Internet’s extraordinary and exponential growth is a function of the 
“friction-free” character of virtual space interactions.1  In real space there is 
always the problem of matching buyers and sellers, of hooking up those with 
information to those who desire it, i.e., friction.  The Internet represents the 
possibility of a perfect market, where information is shared instantly and the 
laws of supply and demand allocate resources without impediment.  Justly 
hailed as the key to the Web’s commercial vitality, this dramatic reduction in 
transaction costs complicates the adoption of real space legal paradigms to the 
Internet.  The near lack of friction generates two inter-linked paradoxes.  First, 
while navigation of virtual space without the friction inherent in print produces 
all the freedom for which the Internet is rightly celebrated, it exponentially 
increases the potential for harm and the inevitable calls for contraction and 
control.  Second, while the law governing cyberspace will naturally be built on 
traditional legal rules, print culture law was shaped by the very friction whose 
absence makes cyberspace so promising.  Legal architects in this new world 
are, therefore, destined to find friction-reliant constructs unavailable. 
This essay examines real space friction and its suggested virtual space 
antithetical.  In the context of liability for content during the transition from 
print to post-print culture, I identify some of the salient characteristics of 
friction-free virtual space.  I then explore in detail the impact of anonymous 
participation2 and indeterminate dissemination on ex post facto liability rules in 
the growth area of cybertorts. 
 
*  © 2000 Nicolas P. Terry.  All rights reserved.  Based upon a speech given at the conference 
Print Culture in the Electronic Age, The Center for the Humanities, University of Missouri-St. 
Louis, March 26-27, 1998.  I dedicate this essay to my colleague Professor Eileen Searls; I thank 
her for her years of wonderful service to our law school and for her unflagging support of my 
research. 
**  Professor of Law, Saint Louis University School of Law.  My thanks to Christopher Hoffman 
(SLU Law 2000) for his diligent editorial assistance. 
 1. See infra notes 33-36 and accompanying text. 
 2. See generally ACLU v. Miller, 977 F. Supp. 1228 (N.D. Ga. 1997). 
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II.  CONTENT CULTURES, LAW AND FRICTION 
Among the attributes of cyberspace most often referred to are its lack of 
physicality,3 its functional purposes,4 and its relation to real space.5  Still others 
are its social and cultural roles, statistical growth,6 and of course there is the 
obligatory footnote comparing it to the information explosion following the 
invention of movable type.7 
The legal rules developed for print culture provide the initial and obvious 
paradigm for managing Internet content issues.  Those traditional rules are 
found in Intellectual Property law and in the First Amendment protections of 
speech.  Intellectual Property law, called forth from the Constitution,8 protects 
the rights of writers and publishers.  Political and artistic speech is protected 
from both government censorship9 and the chilling prospect of civil liability 
for defamation.10  A few regulatory concessions to the FCC notwithstanding,11 
print culture has now passed the favored-child baton to other media.  And, as 
we look back at the demise of the Communications Decency Act courtesy of 
Reno v. ACLU,12 the early indications are that the Supreme Court is prepared to 
turn back the most egregious legislative sorties designed to regulate content in 
virtual space.13 
 
 3. A collection of tools such as the Web and email are “located in no particular 
geographical location but available to anyone, anywhere in the world, with access to the Internet.” 
Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 851 (1997). 
 4. Id. (“From the publishers’ point of view, it constitutes a vast platform from which to 
address and hear from a world-wide audience of millions of readers, viewers, researchers, and 
buyers.”). 
 5. Id. (“The Web is . . . comparable, from the readers’ viewpoint, to both a vast library 
including millions of readily available and indexed publications and a sprawling mall offering 
goods and services.”). 
 6. Id. 
 7. And here it is.  See Bruno Giussani, Is It Really Gutenberg All Over Again?, N.Y TIMES, 
(Jan. 6, 1998) <http://www.nytimes.com/library/cyber/euro/010698euro.html>. 
 8. “The Congress shall have Power . . . To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, 
by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective 
Writings and Discoveries.” U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8. 
 9. Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95-96 (1972). 
 10. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
 11. See, e.g., FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978). 
 12. See generally Reno, 521 U.S. at 844.  The CDA has now been followed by the Child 
Online Protection Act (COPA), that is itself the subject of suit and ongoing injunctive relief. 
 13. For other public law content regulation issues see U.S. v. Hilton, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 
1105 (1st Cir. 1999); Free Speech Coalition v. Reno, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 32704 (9th Cir. 
1999); People v. Barrows, 1998 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 332 (NY Cnty Ct. 1998); Urofsky v. Gilmore, 
167 F.3d 191(4th Cir. 1999). 
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Content in cyberspace is dynamic and the product of convergent 
technologies.14  But its dominant characteristic is the way it captures the 
relationships between publishers, content, and readers.  Specifically, the 
fundamental shift from print culture to web culture involves the transformation 
of the way recipients of information interact with its content.  Back in 1993, 
Wired Magazine noted “[i]n the world of immersion, authorship is no longer 
the transmission of experience, but rather the construction of utterly personal 
experiences.”15 
In addition to immersion and discrete reader interaction with content 
(promoted by the new medium’s added dimensionality, multiple paths, etc.), 
the character of the content itself changes as it is absorbed and re-written in 
real time by its on-line consumers.  In cyberspace we already have experience 
with social,16 local, and regional17 communities.  Others revolve around 
gaming,18 the professions,19 and retail commerce.  According to Esther Dyson, 
“[u]sed right, the Internet can be a powerful enabling technology fostering the 
development of communities because it supports the very thing that creates a 
community—human interaction.”20  In contrast to real space (and so at odds 
with some real space legal tenets) virtual space participatory readership and 
content-based communities frequently prosper because of the anonymity of 
their participants.21  Even if anonymity is not sought explicitly, the 
indeterminate nature of virtual communities and the indeterminate 
dissemination of content contrast markedly with the more predictable 
memberships and distributions in real space. 
Markets that have embraced virtual space most quickly have done so 
because of the user type (such as the technologically enthused),22 the product 
 
 14. See David Kushner, The Communications Decency Act and the Indecent Indecency 
Spectacle, 19 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 87, 118-23 (1996). 
 15. WIRED Wonders, WIRED (Dec. 1993) (statement credited to Brenda Laurel), 
<http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/1.06/wired.wonders_pr.html>. 
 16. See generally <http://www.ivillage.com/>; <http://www.oxygen.com>. 
 17. See generally <http://www.citysearch.com/>. 
 18. See generally <http://www.nytimes.com/library/tech/yr/mo/circuits/game-theory/26game 
-theory.html>. 
 19. See generally <http://medem.com/>; <http://www.law.com/>. 
 20. ESTHER DYSON, RELEASE 2.0 32 (1997). 
 21. See e.g., Taylor & Jerome, Blind Date, PC COMPUTING, July 1998, at 75. 
On the Internet, no one knows you’re a dog. That nubile ballerina you’ve been e-mailing 
could really be a 45-year-old bricklayer with a goatee. Not a few on-line lawyers run their 
practices from the pokey. People who describe themselves in chat rooms as good-looking, 
athletic, or rich rarely are. Even more troubling than the whacked disguises people don in 
cyberspace is their ability to remain entirely anonymous. This is especially annoying 
when you’re trying to squeeze them for cash. 
Id. See also Two Faces of Online Anonymity, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 1998. 
 22. See, e.g., Dell Computers, at <http://www.dell.com/>. 
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type/existing distribution infrastructure,23 or the electronic medium’s superior 
ability to parse information and thereby reduce information costs associated 
with certain services24 and sales.25  Equally, the web’s intrinsic technology 
markets have driven commercial volume.  Just as the invention of type 
required the search engine we call a library,26 virtual space has brought us 
Yahoo27 and Google.28  New forms of commerce, such as on-line auctions,29 
business-to-business,30 group buying,31 and shopping agents32 abound.  Soon, 
we will see the sale of digital goods, such as information, music or video, by 
“micro-slice” delivered from massive data warehouses and paid for with low 
transaction cost micro-payment systems, i.e., the ability to charge someone a 
fraction of a penny (for, let’s say a single newspaper article) without incurring 
crippling transaction costs.33 
Of particular interest in the realm of content liability, virtual space has very 
low entry barriers for aspiring authors, publishers, and aggregators of 
information.  Indeed, the Supreme Court, comparing cyberspace to other media 
and types of speech, noted: 
It provides relatively unlimited, low-cost capacity for communication of all 
kinds. . . . This dynamic, multifaceted category of communication includes not 
only traditional print and news services, but also audio, video, and still images, 
as well as interactive, real-time dialogue.  Through the use of chat rooms, any 
person with a phone line can become a town crier with a voice that resonates 
farther than it could from any soapbox.  Through the use of Web pages, mail 
exploders, and newsgroups, the same individual can become a pamphleteer. 34 
Not only are entry costs low, but cyberspace-enabled commerce has very 
low information and transaction costs.  Bill Gates has championed virtual 
space for its “friction-free capitalism,”35 the idea that ubiquitous and equal 
access to information will create the closest thing yet to a perfect market.  
 
 23. See, e.g., books, <www.amazon.com>, or CDs, <www.cdnow.com>. 
 24. See, e.g., airline tickets or travel, <http://www.expedia.com>. 
 25. See, e.g. automobiles, <http://carpoint.msn.com/home/New.asp>. 
 26. See generally, Robert Berring, Chaos, Cyberspace and Tradition: Legal Information 
Transmogrified, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 189 (1997), <http://www.law.berkeley.edu/btlj/articles/ 
12-1/berring.html>. 
 27. <http://www.yahoo.com>. 
 28. <http://www.google.com>. 
 29. <http://www.ebay.com>. 
 30. <http://www.Bizee.com Inc>. 
 31. <http://www.mercata.com>; <http://www.mobshop.com>. 
 32. <http://www.MySimon.com>, <http://www.Click the Button.com>. 
 33. See generally, Mark Stefik, Shifting the Possible: How Trusted Systems and Digital 
Property Rights Challenge Us to Rethink Digital Publishing, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 137 
(1997). 
 34. Reno v. ACLU 521 U.S. 844 (1997) at 869 (emphasis added). 
 35. See generally BILL GATES, THE ROAD AHEAD (1995). 
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Though it is a little early to hail our current virtual space markets as truly 
friction-free36 and the idea that even with the Internet people will “know 
everything, all the time” is not “fiction-free,” technology is making great 
strides in that direction.  Web commerce engines and agents sporting price-
matching capabilities should allow almost friction-free negotiation.37  Finally, 
much of the transaction cost in a negotiation is about identity and financial 
wherewithal of the parties; presumably digital certificates, escrowed digital 
IDs and digital money will bring us close to zero transaction costs here as well. 
III.  LIABILITY RULES, ANONYMITY AND INDETERMINATE DISSEMINATION 
Even when dealing solely with “print” defendants, civil content liability is 
a complex doctrinal area.  When it comes to the potential liability of authors 
and publishers38 the First Amendment is still applied vigorously because state 
law liability rules can chill the free discussion of ideas.  Therefore, the legal 
rules are immediately complicated as constitutional law considerations rub 
shoulders with substantive tort law principles such as “duty.”  Perhaps more 
surprisingly, civil content liability (defamation aside) is a somewhat immature 
area, with little consistency among the cases.39 
There are myriad examples of courts applying ex post facto content 
liability analysis that spark interesting virtual space examples.  These include 
defamation, privacy issues, and the transmission of SPAM.  However, I will 
concentrate on the narrow sub-set of scenarios where persons are physically 
harmed as a result of the quality or substance of the information disseminated. 
Many of the decided real space cases concentrate only on the delicate 
constitutional issues.  But we can also detect judicial sensitivity to liability 
scenarios that exhibit low transaction costs.  Courts frequently reference what 
 
 36. While this may have validity at the level of identifying transaction parties, Merges 
identifies transaction costs, albeit much lower ones, in negotiation, performance, and 
enforcement.  Robert P. Merges, The End of Friction? Property Rights and Contract in the 
“Newtonian” World of On-Line Commerce, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 115, 116 (1997), 
<http://www.law.berkeley.edu /btlj/articles/12-1/merges.html>. 
 37. See, e.g., Kevin Jones, Comparison Shopping- Unable to Beat ’em, Web Sites Join ’em, 
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 1998, <http://www.nytimes.com/library/tech/98/03/cyber/articles/ 
29buyer.html>; <http://www.necx.com/>.  “Price The Market”: 
Provides you with pricing from other online retailers so you don’t have to leave the 
NECX web site to research market prices 
Includes hot links to the other sites that are listed 
Is not a marketing tactic or a “meet or beat” pricing program. It’s an evaluation tool we 
have added to our portfolio of award-winning online capabilities to help you shop smart. 
Id. 
 38. I use this term to include re-publishers. 
 39. See generally Nicolas P. Terry, Apologetic Tort Think: Autonomy and Information Torts, 
38 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 189 (1993), Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Tort Liability, the First Amendment, and 
Equal Access to Electronic Networks, 5 HARV. J. L. & TECH 65, 131-34 (1992). 
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are known as “floodgates” arguments, the most famous being Justice 
Cardozo’s warning that we should avoid exposing defendants to “liability in an 
indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate class.”40  
Courts have been particularly sensitive to cases involving mass media 
exposure,41 speech-based misrepresentation, and emotional distress damages.  
All of these have the potential to spill over, without limit. 
(i)  Liability for disseminating inaccurate content 
The first type of cases where ex post facto liability may be applied concern 
the quality of the information provided.  I start with a travel guide that failed to 
mention the dangerous ocean surf conditions at a beach resort.42  The publisher 
was held to be under no duty to warn a reader: 
It appears from a review of relevant case law that no jurisdiction has held a 
publisher liable in negligence for personal injury suffered in reliance upon 
information contained in the publication, unless the publisher authored or 
guaranteed the information.  Whether based on negligent misrepresentation or 
negligent manufacture of a defective product, the cases uniformly hold, for the 
same policy reasons, that, absent guaranteeing or authoring the contents of the 
publication, a publisher has no duty to investigate and warn its readers of the 
accuracy of the contents of its publications.43 
That seems to take care of passive, non-intrusive publishers,44 albeit at the 
expense of a perverse inventive.  But what about authors?  It is open to 
question whether this author/publisher dichotomy can survive in virtual space, 
where the lines are blurred not just between authors and publishers and 
aggregators, but between authors and readers.45 
Will publishers be spared liability with regard to every type of published 
information?  There is a line of cases dealing with aeronautical charts.  The 
classic scenario is a plane crashing into the side of a hill during an instrument-
approach landing because the hill was missing from the instrument-approach 
chart designed and disseminated by the defendant.46  In these cases plaintiffs 
 
 40. Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, Niven & Co., 174 N.E. 441, 444 (N.Y. 1931).  In 
Ultramares Justice Cardozo specifically distinguished between injuries caused by “physical 
force” and “the circulation of a thought or a release of the explosive power resident in words.” Id. 
at 445. Other examples would be the courts’ concerns with other forces that are not limited by 
types of physical space or drag (e.g., emotional harm damages, economic loss damages). 
 41. See generally Joel Rothstein Wolfson, Electronic Mass Information Providers and 
Section 552 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts: The First Amendment Casts a Long Shadow, 29 
RUTGERS L.J. 67 (1997). 
 42. Birmingham v. Fodor’s Travel Publications, Inc., 833 P.2d 70 (Haw. 1992). 
 43. Id. at 75 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added). 
 44. See also Barden v. HarperCollins Publishers, Inc., 863 F. Supp. 41 (D. Mass. 1994). 
 45. This is particularly true in collaborative environments. See e.g., <http://www.nytimes. 
com/library/cyber/nation/011698nation.html>. 
 46. See Fluor Corp. v. Jeppesen & Co., 216 Cal. Rptr. 68 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985). 
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have had success alleging that the chart was a “product” and thus subject to 
strict product liability doctrine.  The court in one case noted that it was 
erroneous to believe that “strict liability principles are applicable only to items 
whose physical properties render them innately dangerous, e.g., mechanical 
devices, explosives, combustible or flammable materials, etc.”47 
That may be a strong argument, but was given little credence by one 
Pennsylvania appellate court.  There, the publisher of a diet book entitled The 
Last Chance Diet was sued when a reader died of complications arising from 
the liquid protein diet featured in the book.48  The plaintiff brought a product 
liability action, arguing that the diet was a “product” and the book was a 
patient package insert (PPI).49  The court concluded: “Instructions by a 
manufacturer which accompany medication or use of certain marketed goods 
cannot be equated with publication of books which espouse a writer’s theory, 
opinions or ideology.”50  In holding that strict product liability doctrine was not 
applicable to a book, the court distinguished the map and chart cases as 
follows: 
In those cases, extremely technical and detailed materials were involved, upon 
which a limited class of persons imposed absolute trust having reason to 
believe in their unqualified reliability.  As such they took on the attributes of a 
product and are not protected by the first amendment.51 
It is uncertain, as the web becomes an extension of or a substitute for 
product packaging, which of these two lines of cases applies to a drug 
company52 or a tampon manufacturer53 providing “super PPI” information in 
virtual space.54 
(ii) Liability for the decision to disseminate dangerous content 
The second broad type of quandary facing the author-publisher involves 
the decision to disseminate.  These are probably the most challenging cases.  
The question is whether there can ever be liability for disseminating 
information that is true, non-defamatory, entirely accurate and non-
pornographic.  Of course, what counts as pornographic is not so easy to 
 
 47. Id. at 71. 
 48. Smith v. Linn, 563 A.2d 123, 126 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989). 
 49. Id. at 125-26. The court was dismissive of plaintiff’s arguments relating to exceptions to 
the First Amendment and a negligent publication argument.  Id. 
 50. Id. at 126. 
 51. Id. at 127. 
 52. See, e.g., <http://www.rogaineonline.com>.  See generally Perez v. Wyeth Laboratories 
Inc., 734 A.2d 1245 (N.J. 1999) (restricting the reach of the learned intermediary rule after 
recognizing modern—DTC—techniques in drug marketing).  Id. 
 53. See, e.g., <http://www.always.com>. 
 54. See generally, Nicolas P. Terry, Cyber-Malpractice: Legal Exposure for Cybermedicine, 
25 AM. J. L. & MED. 327 (1999). 
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determine.  The best case to start with, therefore, is a borderline case.  In 
Herceg v. Hustler,55 the plaintiffs’ 14-year old son took his own life attempting 
the practice of autoerotic asphyxia.  He had read about the practice in a Hustler 
Magazine article entitled “Orgasm of Death.”  The article contained both 
descriptions of the practice and warnings against it, including the phrases “DO 
NOT ATTEMPT” and “auto-asphyxiation is one form of sex play you try only 
if you’re anxious to wind up in cold storage, with a coroner’s tag on your big 
toe.”56  Citing well-known First Amendment case law, the court found the 
speech was protected.57  The Fifth Circuit concluded: 
If the shield of the first amendment can be eliminated by proving after 
publication that an article discussing a dangerous idea negligently helped bring 
about a real injury simply because the idea can be identified as “bad,” all free 
speech becomes threatened.  An article discussing the nature and danger of 
“crack” usage—or of hang-gliding—might lead to liability just as easily. . . .  
Mere negligence, therefore, cannot form the basis of liability under the 
incitement doctrine any more than it can under libel doctrine.58 
Take another case: you place an advertisement in the magazine Soldier of 
Fortune that reads “GUN FOR HIRE: 37 year old professional mercenary 
desires jobs.  Vietnam Veteran.  Discrete and very private.  Body guard, 
courier, and other special skills. All jobs considered.”59  Needless to say, the 
gun is hired, performs his work, and the magazine is sued by the victim’s 
family. 
The first thing to note is that we now enter a murky sub-set of free speech.  
Generally, advertisements are commercial speech and receive only limited 
First Amendment protection.60  The court recognized that in the face of chilling 
 
 55. Herceg v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 814 F.2d 1017 (5th Cir. 1987) cert. denied 485 U.S. 
959 (1988). 
 56. Id. at 1018-19. 
 57. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).  The court noted that under the 
Brandenburg test, 
[I]t would be necessary for the plaintiffs to have proved that: 
 1. Autoerotic asphyxiation is a lawless act. 
 2. Hustler advocated this act. 
 3. Hustler’s publication went even beyond “mere advocacy” and amounted to incitement. 
 4. The incitement was directed to imminent action. 
Herceg, 814 F.2d at 1022. 
 58. Herceg, 814 F.2d at 1024. 
 59. Braun v. Soldier of Fortune Magazine, Inc., 968 F.2d 1110, 1112 (11th Cir. 1992), cert. 
denied 506 U.S. 1071 (1993) (affirming 757 F. Supp. 1325 (M.D. Ala. 1991)). 
 60. See, e.g., Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 759 n.4 
(1985).  See also Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 455-56 (1978).  For a content-ex 
post facto liability type case, see Herceg v. Hustler, where the Fifth Circuit apparently viewed a 
mere “promotional device” as commercial speech in contrast with content disseminated for profit 
that could still qualify as noncommercial speech.  Hustler, 814 F.2d at 1024. 
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rules the publisher is more likely to decline to publish than to persevere with 
the customer’s message.61  Moreover, chilling advertisement might impact 
protected non-commercial speech by impeding the publication of a magazine 
or newspaper.62  As such, the court viewed a pure negligence standard as 
constitutionally flawed, presumably because the traditional common law 
negligence rule of constructive foresight63 contemplated publisher liability 
based solely on a failure to investigate.  Thus a “modified” negligence standard 
was required, triggered by some intrinsic quality in the published content.  The 
court summarized its position as follows: 
[W]e conclude that the First Amendment permits a state to impose upon a 
publisher liability for compensatory damages for negligently publishing a 
commercial advertisement where the ad on its face, and without the need for 
investigation, makes it apparent that there is a substantial danger of harm to the 
public.  The absence of a duty requiring publishers to investigate the 
advertisements they print and the requirement that the substance of the ad itself 
must warn the publisher of a substantial danger of harm to the public guarantee 
that the burden placed on publishers will not impermissibly chill protected 
commercial speech.64 
Applying this standard, the court concluded that the “modified” negligence 
standard had been met by the specific exclusion of a duty to investigate and the 
requirement that “the language of the ad itself contain a clearly identifiable 
unreasonable risk of harm to the public.”65 
Suitably “chilled,” suppose your gunman-for-hire retires his semi-
automatic for a word processor, and writes a book describing his craft.  The 
 
 61. Braun, 968 F.2d at 1117-18. 
 62. Id. at 1118. 
 63. See generally 57 AM. JUR. 2D Negligence §§130-35 (1989): 
The probability of injury by one to the legally protected interest of another is the basis for 
the law’s creation of a duty to avoid such injury, and foresight of harm lies at the 
foundation of the duty to use care and therefore of negligence. The broad test of 
negligence is what a reasonably prudent person would foresee and would do in the light of 
this foresight under the circumstances. Negligence is clearly relative in reference to the 
knowledge of the risk of injury to be apprehended. The risk reasonably to be perceived 
defines the duty to be obeyed; it is the risk reasonably within the range of apprehension, 
of injury to another person, that is taken into account in determining the existence of the 
duty to exercise care. In other words, damages for an injury resulting from a negligent act 
of the defendant may be recovered if a reasonably prudent and careful person should have 
anticipated, under the same or similar circumstances, that injury to the plaintiff or to those 
in a like situation would probably result. The most common test of negligence, therefore, 
is whether the consequences of the alleged wrongful act were reasonably to be foreseen as 
injurious to others coming within the range of such acts. 
See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 283 (1964). 
 64. Braun, 968 F.2d at 1119 (footnote omitted). 
 65. Id. 
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case of Rice v. Paladin Enterprises, Inc.66 concerned such a book:  Hit Man: A 
Technical Manual for Independent Contractors, produced by the defendant 
publisher.67  The criminal responsible for the three murders that was the 
background to Rice “meticulously followed countless of Hit Man’s 130 pages 
of detailed factual instructions on how to murder and to become a professional 
killer.”68  The book was found in the killer’s apartment after the crime.69  In 
order to pass constitutional muster the court required that any liability rule 
should apply not merely to publishers who could foresee such actions but also 
to “those who would, for profit or other motive, intentionally assist and 
encourage crime and then shamelessly seek refuge in the sanctuary of the First 
Amendment.”70 
From examining these two types of content liability cases from real space 
it is clear that the courts have circumscribed a relatively narrow window of ex 
post facto liability.  Should a similar approach not follow in cyberspace?  Here, 
the friction-free paradoxes again assert themselves.  The anonymous 
participation and indeterminate dissemination in virtual space would seem to 
allow defenses for content providers based on “floodgates” arguments and the 
protection of mass media.  Yet, the potential for harm from dissemination of 
inaccurate or dangerous information on the web is immense.  In real space, 
courts seem to be satisfied to impose liability in a small number of cases (e.g., 
chart cases and some gun for hire advertisements), confident that this will have 
some deterrent effect on all content providers.  Even assuming the efficacy of 
this approach71 it is difficult to see how courts will the narrow their targets in 
cyberspace. 
 
 66. 128 F.3d 233 (4th Cir. 1997). 
 67. For a listing of the publisher’s titles, see <http://www.paladin-press.com/backlist.html>. 
The online description for Hit Man is as follows: 
HIT MAN 
A Technical Manual for Independent Contractors 
by Rex Feral 
Learn how a pro gets assignments, creates a false identity, makes a disposable silencer, 
leaves the scene without a trace, watches his mark unobserved and more. Feral reveals 
how to get in, do the job and get out without getting caught. For academic study only. 5 
1/2 x 8 1/2, softcover, photos, illus., 144 pp. 
ISBN 0-87364-276-7. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .$10.00 
<http://www.paladin-press.com/surv-elecA-L.html> (emphasis in original). 
 68. Rice, 128 F.3d at 239. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. at 247-48 (cross-reference omitted). 
 71. Such deterrence arguments themselves involve considerable information costs issues. 
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CONCLUSION 
The ex post facto content liability rules pose real problems when we 
consider transferring them to virtual space.  First, courts are more willing to 
impose liability where the situation is unique, not the least because they prefer 
not to crowd their dockets with hundreds or thousands of cases.  In global 
virtual space, where any number of persons may access the offending content, 
courts may find it difficult (or impossible) to identify unique cases.  Second, 
courts have preferred liability rules predicated on face-to-face interaction, a 
cyberspace antithetical, between plaintiff and defendant, where there was some 
preexisting relationship or some particular knowledge of a party’s identity or 
circumstances.  Third, the few deeply entrenched rules we have rely on a clean 
distinction between author, publisher and reader: a distinction that is difficult 
to establish in interactive cyberspace. 
In reacting to a post print world of reduced friction we have made 
something of an inauspicious start in dealing with content regulation.  We 
should be justifiably suspicious of early legislative forays that seem to be 
placeholders or, worse, trial balloons72 rather than considered, long-term 
solutions.  The only consistent theme in the area of content liability has been 
carving out an exception for “common carriers.”  The 1996 
Telecommunications Act attempted to carve out such an area of immunity for 
ISPs.73  However, the world of content, particularly the friction-free 
cyberspace world of content, poses liability questions that are not susceptible 
to such simple solutions.  Rules for virtual space tend to be decided by the 
secular (non-digital) among us.  As a result, we could find ourselves with laws 
we very well might deserve, but which we decidedly do not want.  The 
temptation is to isolate cyberspace content from regulation, at least for now.  
Yet the paradox haunts us as we observe the effect that the friction-free 
environment has on our real space calculus.  It is that paradox that compels the 
presence of content regulation and guarantees that we will be examining the 
“dark reflection”74 of cyberspace. 
 
 72. This is arguably the case with the Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230 (1994 
& Supp. II 1996). 
 73. Id. § 230(c)(1).  See generally Doe v. American Online, Inc., 718 So. 2d 385, (Fla. Ct. 
App. 1998), Blumenthal, v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44, (D.D.C. 1998).  More complex, albeit 
conceptually related provisions apply to ISPs and other conduits regarding alleged copyright 
violations.  See Online Copyright Infringement Liability Limitation Act, 17 U.S.C. § 512 (1994). 
 74. We want not only rules that apply to everyone, but also a system that responds to the 
particular needs of citizens. 
We expect lawyers to fulfill both desires, and so they are a constant irritating reminder 
that we are neither a peaceable kingdom of harmony and order, nor a land of undiluted 
individual autonomy, but somewhere disorientingly in between. Lawyers, in the very 
exercise of their profession, are the necessary bearers of that bleak winter’s tale, and we 
hate them for it. We hate them, that is, because they are our own dark reflection. 
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